The Dynamics of the Leave Campaign

Hello and welcome to Not Another One, the podcast with Me Steve Richards , Miranda Green, Ian Martin, and Tim Montgomery, thank you for tuning in . And it is, believe it or not , close to the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum . And we're going to be reflecting on that now because when the actual date falls, it's days after the Andy Bernam Bye election, and I think everyone will have other things to focus on then . So we're going to do it now. And it's interesting Norma Percy has got another documentary out about this. Michael Goeb says on it in the first part it seems both very, very distant and like yesterday . And I know exactly what you mean . I can remember exactly where I was that night. Can you june twenty sixteen? Yeah, absolutely. I was in the ITV studios on Gray's Inn Road and everybody sort of wafted in, went through makeup and was discussing how it was going to be incredibly close and probably about fifty two forty eight, but everybody got it the wrong way round in that green room interestingly . And so there was lots of chat. And I think while we were waiting for the result, we all trooped on air and said pompous things about how this was really good ought to be a wake up call for all the things that had been ignored for so many years. I think I said that on the assumption, you know, that it was a wake up call but not an actual actively holy . What were you doing? I was at a friend's drinks party or can watch party thing in was co op champagne here. Westminster? No, no , it was called Roger Not quite, not quite. But it was a very jolly party until it became clear which side was winning. And there were a handful of us at the party were Brexiteers, and we were almost s weort were of put in a corner the party I just had so I had a good view of the party all the glasses clinking, everyone's very jolly. The room that I'm going to guess was eighty ninety percent remainer . And then the TV went on and Sund came through and that was the most people start and then it started to dawn what was happening. I do remember whose dawn was it? A new has broken down? That was a different one. That was a different one. But I do a hallway. I do remember the hostess, who's who's a dear friend after about twenty minutes of that and it becoming apparent this is actually going to happen. Leave is going to leave is going to win. She suggested it might be better if I was elsewhere. Really I had and left. And then I went I went off and watched I sat in sat in a club with a couple of friends where there was a TV screen on and watched the whole thing through and a friend of mine spoke to David Cameron just as he was about to go out and quit and it was what an extraordinary evening it was. Yeah, well of course that was by the morning, wasn't it? Yeah quick ly. Tim, where were you? Well, I was in the BBC stud or it was I think it was it pinewood or whatever. They did this extraordinary in El Street Ell Street. Yeah. And I was on with Alistair Campbell and Emily Matless and of course Emily Mateless was still technically imp anartial BBC presenter at that point . But the mood was quite funereal. And you see, I did not expect Brexit to win. And so when you sort of have something that you want and is unexpected. You sort of you get a little bit happy. And so my mood was just sort of like a childish sort of you know Christmas Eve mood before Christmas and I wasn't deliberately trying to provoke them but I really, think they thought that I was . And so we didn't actually do much broadcasting because the results came in were incredibly thick and fast at that time. But behind the scenes I think I was just irritating them to an extraordinary extent. So I remember that from the evening . But what I do remember is what did prepare me a little bit few hours before the result came through was I spoke to David Davis and of course if people remember the context the polls weren't really showing a leave win. Miranda's experience, I think was typical in green rooms and Nigel Farage basically conceded the referendum of people . But David Davis, I spoke to him and he said, We're going to win . And his evidence for it was that people who'd never voted before in his constituency have turned out in absolute droves . And he said, I'm convinced they've voted all for Brexit. And I think the evidence afterwards proved that he was right. It was the non voter, the people who'd never really been energized by politics before , that they made the difference. And of course in London, I don't remember that night. There'd been terrible rain, hadn't there? Incredible rain in London, which had really depressed, I think , turnout, particularly in the southeast and perhaps amongst younger people , but that rain hadn't fallen in the north , which only goes to prove that God is a brectiteer Also remember that morning, I also remember that morning getting a phone call as a camera had just resigned or whatever and the phone going and it being a certain certain newspaper I won't name which newspaper that I very occasionally wrote for. And they'd had their morning meeting where I think some people were in tears . And the editor of the day had pointed out that they didn't have a single person who was writing. They had about thirty writers lined up to write analysis. And it just dawned them and they didn't have a single one who'd actually voted for Brexit. So could I write them a thousand words or so? Which I did. And I thought at the time, I thought, look, this is a great example of healing . This is where the process begins. That's the end of that, then. We're going to come together as a country and unite around the decision to leave the EU. Didn't happen? Did you really think that? I'm kind of joking. But I did think I did think that there would be a broad acceptance and a move fairly quickly over that summer. I'm sure we'll get into what went wrong. We should find that you're where you were Steve. But actually just answering your question, Miranda. I remember in the day or so after, maybe the day after the vote, I remember going up a ramp, you know, in the in the square opposite parliament where you do all the TV interviews. And this gentleman, Peter Malison, I don't know whether any of you heard of him, he was coming down. Basically Yeah, and then I said to him, well we all need to pull together now. We're going to need your help. We're going to need Nick Clegg's help. We're going to need to make this thing work . And he was too shelf shock really just sort of mumbled something to me which I can't remember. Yeah, just on this kind of predicting the result . The comedian Stuart Lee tells of a call he had from a friend of his on the day of the referendum and it went along these lines Stu , I think it's going to be alright. I'm in a cafe in Stoke Newington and they've all voted remain Oh my goodness as a counter to that, there were people travelling the country for a long time in advance . I remember Eve Cooper coming back from her constituency and telling me and others on a regular basis months before the referendum this is lost. And of course in her constituency it was . And that goes back to another thing I had which was on the day Cameron announced the referendum . I thought it was lost from that moment. I just thought the mood of the country was to stick two fingers up at the establishment and I had a conversation with Bernard Jenkin , who said to me, I'll never forget it because he ended up being on the winning side, but he said, Steve, we were never pushing for this referendum. He thought he was going to lose. I said to him, You will win it. Don't worry, don't start arguing against this referendum. You're going to win it. And he thought we were going to lose. I was absolutely sure from the beginning, but I was at a party stuff full of remainers, many of whom were in tears. Actually, I've never seen, you know, I'm usually on the losing side on these nights, election nights and so on. I've never seen anything quite like it. And that intensity was an echo was sort of a warning of what was to come. But so let's return to the theme and the decision to call that referendum because it seems to me whether you're a Brexiteer or remainer , Cameron 's entire approach was incredibly shallow, an assumption that he could get much from Merkel based on sort of Itonian charm. She didn't know him anything . And the idea that they would shift on free movement, well, every single person I spoke to knew that that wouldn't happen . But he had pledged at a party conference he was going to reduce numbers to sort of three or four something mad . And so the negotiation, I think, was doomed from the beginning and the assumption that people like Michael Gove would back him because he's friends with him again strikes me as just naivety on a spectacular level. Are we all in agreement about that whether we disagree about Brexit does anyone ? Well, I tell you what, I do agree with that and it seems to me not just naivety but also the whole approach was very tactical . So it was sort of conceding the big thing we're going to hold a referendum that we might lose whilst thinking you could manipulate the we now think somewhat inevitable result away by playing around with the timing, by this quite cynical ploy to say, well, in the meantime, we're going to go to Europe and we're going to talk to our partners and we're going to talk to Brussels and we're going to get important concessions that the country can then get behind and that exercise was always superficial, right? Yeah . So that was certainly doomed to fail. And I remember talking to lots of people about the timing of the referendum after Cameron made that cru cial speech at Bloomberg where he said yes, I will hold this referendum and deciding on the timing . I remember doing a lot of reporting at the time on when it would be and they picked june twenty sixteen because they thought that was optimal for seeing off the Brexiters and that was not the case. So I think a lot of it, I think you're right, Steve. I think that whole approach to Merkel to Brussels, all the rest of it was superficial, but also I think it was just being seen as some sort of political game and having won the Scottish referendum just and having seen off the AV referendum, I think possibly in number ten they just thought yeah we can we can do these. We know how to yeah we know how to win things . Yeah does anyone buy the kind of Daniel Finkelstein defense? I mean he was doing, endless interviews with C ameron every Sunday evening . And he is adamant that Cameron felt it was necessary for the country to have this. This is the kind of defense for it. Not just the Tory party, though obviously that was part of it . And he wasn't ever complacent , but it was a necessary act . Now that's the case with the defense. I don't buy it at all. No one was talking about it And no, no, no, no, no, no, no, that's too far, that's too far. I think I don't agree with you. Fundamentally, it was naive what Danny Finkelstein said, but the idea that no one was talking about it, come on. Well, the this had been an issue that had ripped the Tory party apart for decades . It was deep and it comes party. It comes just finish? Then let me clarify now And really when Mrs. Thatcher was brought down , which we did a special series, three episodes for if people can't remember them, go back to them. Those are some of the best episodes, I think we did as a podcast team. Mrs. Thatcher was brought down because of Europe and when she was brought down, she basically gave her marching orders to the Conservative Party to finish the job that she had been brought down over, which was the whole issue of Europe and European integration, monetary union, etc . So this was absolutely extraordinary . And I don't think David Cameron will have won the twenty fifteen election if he'd allowed the sort of UKIP Nizal Farage thing then to take off. He know George Osbourne was opposed to the referendum , but actually David Cameron had no option other than to deal with this issue. And I remember David Aronovitz saying to me, Why are you going on about Europe? No one cares about Europe . And then no one cared about Europe because he was on the winning side. When he was on the losing side, suddenly Romainers cared about it, a very great deal indeed. And so the idea that no one was talking about this deep really is hold on for that. Let me absolutely clarify. Okay. All right, I've been obsessed by the theme of Europe and its disruptive impact on politics for years. By the way, it continues to be disruptive. Brexit didn't end that. No , but I completely agree with you on all of that. Beyond what you said about Margaret Thatcher, because it wasn't clear she was calling for leave. What I meant was at the time Cameron made the announcement, the polls and Cameron was an obsessive reader of polls and focus groups like they all are . Leaving the European Union was way down the list of concerns. I completely accept Europe as an issue was tearing apart the Tory Party in the early seventies, it tore apart the Labour Party, etc . But this specific route of a referendum was not something actually. And one of the things I did a radio four series about Cameron's premiser and Craig Oliver was interesting about two things. So did I, I did another series. They kept making them, didn't they? Well, mine's still on BC Sound. So who's mine? All right. Okay, well mine was in search of the real David Cameron. You're still looking You're feeling left out, Miranda here. Very, Timmy, is yet. Yeah. Well, they all they all spoke on my one as I'm sure they do on very few people spoke on my one no guests at all . Just you. You had a monopoly. It was. Boys, boys. Greg Oliver says on this series available on Beam Sense along with INS two things . One , they got wrong , the defectors . They started to believe Farage and I can completely understand it, that they were going to lose thirty dollars Nigel Farage saying there's many more of these, you know, when they got two or three . And Craigl accepts on the record , that was wrong. There weren't going to be as many as they feared . The other thing he said and I believe him, and this is one of the great myths and perpetrated in the first episode actually of this series by the brilliant Norma Percy , that Cameron made that commitment that Tim says he had to make on the assumption that the coalition will be back in with the Libby's, and the Lib Dems would block it and he wouldn't hold it. Craig Oliver says he would not Cameron have got the agreement of his parliamentary party to form a coalition if he had offered to drop the referendum . They knew under any circumstance if Cameron was prime minister, if Cameron was prime minister, they would have to hold it and Clegg would have to accept it and argue for remain with Cameron. Yeah And I believe or not have a coalition . Or not have a coalition. Exactly. You could have a minority or whatever. But I believe that. That Cameron thought he might well lose and never have to hold this thing . But he knew if he was prime minister in any context to keep that parliamentary party together , he would have to hold it. Look at the I think that's true. Can I just answer for clarification on one? Think about the defectors . Do you mean in the sense that they were particularly worried about the defectors because they had such a narrow majority after twenty fifteen. Well, remember the general defections took place before twenty fifteen the if you're a leader of a party, especially if you're Prime Minister, it is the most frightening thing . If you wake up thinking, God, are another ten going to go today ? And that was the atmosphere . And I think that was one of the factors drawing him towards it , the holding a referendum and it did sort of stop . I remember touching down in America. I was flying over to America for some reason and at the Douglas Carswell and Douglas Carswell I spoke to Douglas Carswell. And then as the phone phone call was ending, Lynton Crosby was on the phone. And Lyndon Crosby said to me, How many more do you think there are? Yeah, I had no idea. No, but that was the mood in the tutorial operation was that there was going to be a wave for defects. Exactly. And that is terrifying. And I think that was a factor. I mean, Michael Gove told him not to have the referendum of course, but I think within number ten, you get this besieged mood and it drove him into what proved to be for him a deadly trap. Possibly. I mean, I'm not I'm not quite sure I agree, Steve. I mean, I think it's we know with leaders, don't we that quite often several several things simultaneously can be true, that it's not definitively one thing or the other. And sometimes leaders try and convince themselves that they've made a decision for one for one reason and then they try and make it appear intellectually coherent. I think it is for those of us who were eurosceptics at the time , the Lisbon Treaty experience and the failure of that campaign to get a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and how that really infuriated dedicated Eurosceptic activists. Something went into the conservative or the centre right, well it's also there were people on the left who thought this as well, bloodstream and people really felt they'd been betrayed over Lisbon over the Lisbon Treaty. And so he's got camera' gots the rise of UKIP going on as described. He's obviously worried about that because the impact on the twenty fifteen election, I do genuinely think that he felt it had to be dealt with, that this was something which had scarred his party . And of course this factor which you just can't overlook this confidence element with Cameron in the way in which his confidence built through two thousand seven, two thousand eight being told that he was finished or two thousand seven when Brown becomes prime minister fighting back from that against the odds . That has such a galvanizing impact on his team. I mean, he goes from the guy who's ruined to being a contender again with the election that never was. Then doesn't win the election in twenty ten but proves the doubter is wrong and becomes Prime Minister because five years earlier lots of people have said they'll never be a Conservative Prime Minister again . And then you get the AV experience and then you get Scotland and it's in those circumstances that he says to Angela Merkel, I'm a win ner. I win these things, which is kind of had been true until true and it's true until until it wasn't. But I don't think I don't I don't buy the idea that he did it in a in a casual or an off hand way. I think he I think he knew the stakes. I think Danny is broadly okay as broadly right in my back the very fact that David Cameron overruled George Osborne that's how much he t hadaken the decision that this mattered because George and Democratic ran the Conservative Party together. It was a complete joint operation. William Hague was there a bit, but not really. It was Cameron and Osbourne and the, very fact that Osborne was implacably opposed to this referendum, but David Cameron rarely took the judgment that he needed to do this. It was I'd love to that would be sort of the documentary I'd love to see a bliss of documentary between Osbourne and Cameron. Talk you about that because that was that must have been those evenings where they discussed that must have. But there's also remember also remember their mindset at the time and I remember the conversations at the time is that think that of course at the time they didn't know what was about to happen, think what they were trying to create . Their aim was to win or come close to winning in twenty fifteen and Cameron was not going to go on forever and, Osbourne might become Prime Minister or Boris might . And if you wanted to create a legacy and you wanted the Tories to govern for ten years after that successfully, there'll be listeners who are laughing at that . Then getting Europe dealt with in a fifty five forty five referendum where it remain wins , which their judgment was they thought that they could win this thing and they'd won previous votes and if they explained the challenges with leaving people that it would be a sort of fifty five, forty five moment , then that would be put to bed, Farage would be dished, and then politics looks quite different and the Tories have dealt with Europe in their terms and and win the subsequent general election. It's not it's not it turned out to be wrong for reasons we're going to get into in terms of what happened in the referendum and the de ep forces underlying it all, but it's not a completely implausible theory. If we take a break and then come back to what followed from that Okay, welcome back where we are, I think we might have to do a second part in this because we haven't we haven't got anywhere close to when the referendum is actually held yet beyond what we were all doing on the night . So Miranda , another thing I think Cameron got wrong, and this is I remember having a long conversation with him about the decision . And it's so long ago I'm sure you wouldn't mind me saying it. He asked me quite a lot about what Harrow Wilson did to win in ' seventy five, which I'll come on to because he did two things that Cameron didn't do. But Cameron also said to me that Britain is basically a small C conservative country. It will vote for the status quo . That's what happened in ' seventy five . And although it's going to be tough, they've got a campaign to win, that will happen here. And it seems to me Cameron never really understood the country he was governing. It was post two thousand eight, a much more restive place as we discover each day. So that was one miscalculation. Seems to me the other was this attempt, which Wilson never did. And I told him this , to try and bind his entire cabinet and Boris Johnson to the project. Wilson always knew he couldn't do that. So there was no attempt. And he tried to turn that into a positive by saying the cabinet will have the right to differ as if it's a positive thing that they were going to fall apart. More Wilson please that was so he worked on the assumption he could persuade Gove and the others and crucially Johnson . And listening to Gove, that was never going to happen. So in my view, it's mistake on mistake or mistake from the camera perspective. Well, the status quo point is fascinating, isn't it? Because what we've all been discussing ever since is the fact that the one thing you know about politics these days is that people will reject the status quo and nowadays. Exactly. But yeah, but yeah, but we all if you think back, we'd already had the Scottish referendum experience , right? So in my memory and this is not just a sort of post hoc analysis, you could feel it in your b ones. twenty fourteen was when you could viscerally feel the whole ground shaking and things really changing. And you were absolutely right, this fed off the great financial crisis and the global recession that followed it and then the decisions as to how to handle fiscally the results of that global recession here and all the rest of it. So I think already confidently saying that the status quo would win in Fenneston, he was never he didn't say it like he said it was going to be one hell of a fight. It's going to be one hell of a battle, but in the end the British vote for the status quo. That was and look what happened in nineteen seventy five and and if we play it right , the British will back the state square. So it wasn't Gung Ho, but that's okay of the country. No okay. It seems to me was another misjudgment By definition, he lost . But to choose to make as your reference point, Harold Wilson's success rather than your narrow escape only a year and a half earlier in Scotland is an odd psycholog thing to do because you know that is holding that is optimism. Yes, I might I might have raised Wilson in the conversation we were having in terms of the lessons. I don't he wasn't that interested in Wilson, I don't think, but we did talk about it a lot, but that might be me , but he certainly did think was it was the queen of this period recollection recollection. Recollections may But also, if you even think about the twenty ten election result, right ? That in itself, even before all of this was an extraordinary event in British peacetime politics, the fact that there was no conclusive result in twenty twenty ten general election and the formation of the first piece. Absolutely. You see what I mean? So actually this whole atmosphere of oh my Lord British politics question mark , what on earth is happening had been actually building the and way, you know, the waves had been building two thousand eight. Since two thousand eight, twenty ten election result, Scotland near miss, all the rest of it. So actually to take such a huge decision on that basis and to be thinking you could be helped by something that happened in the seventies, I think is a bit odd . Also, I do think just, you know, I hear what Ian saying about the genuine need as conservative party leader and trying to think, OK, well how do we secure power for not just me but my one, two successors? This has to be dealt with that still seeing it from the point of view of conservative party management. And I mean, obviously I understand that if somebody's leader of the Conservative Party, they genuinely feel that's the best stewardship for the country . But the rest of us don't necessarily and we will all put through the referendum minutes after on the basis of those decisions which are still just slightly blinkered in the sense that they're thinking only about the Conservative Party's health and grip on power and how to deal with the right flank. I think actually that's part of what the mirror image resentment has sprung from. There was there was a sense, yeah, of course and it's all jumbled up and there's self interest and David David Cameron was always accused, wasn't he of being, you know too, focused on party management. But it was a genuine sense on both sides of the debate that you the country kind of couldn't move on one way or the other. It kept getting stuck on this European question. I mean, there's a perfectly good Brexiteer, but there's a perfectly good remain case for actually for a referendum to say you've got to settle this. We can't actually have a grown up next twenty five years . That'd be a nice thing. Unless unless we resolve those questions . Clegg advocated at one point, didn't it? He did. That's what on that basis, Nick Clegg did, yeah. Yeah. Under pressure from Libdom activists, I think. I don't think he was always mad for one, but I thought it was crazy. I just mentioned some of the sort of mechanics of it though. You know, we can look at these big geo strategic things . But I think something just developing them ae I isan already raised. I think Cameron's complacency was a huge factor here. It really was that's what I raised. Well you raised it. Can't Yes. I mean Ian thinks it was but deeper . Ian sort of was saying well whoever said it was like that Cameron had had a sort of a series of successes, which is true . But I think those successes led to the complacency that you diagnose Steve. Is that you remember who was put in charge of the campaign , you had Andrew Cooper , who was a controversial pollster, let's just put it that way . You had Will Straw, Jack Straw's son, represented Labour, who, you know, lovely guy but probably brilliant, but he'd never run a campaign, national campaign before. Ryan Coates, was it, Miranda, the guy who run the Liberal Democrats basically the people running the in campaign were they were novices in various ways and they had no coherence to them. It's a very important point and I want to come onto the case. Well, whereas if I could just finish the other half is it was almost happened by accident in a way, but you almost it was thought that the Leave campaign wouldn't work because you had two different campaigns. But actually what happened was you had the Leave EU campaign run by Aaron Banks and people who basically went full, you know, nine, ten on the volume scale with their immigration message, which Vote Leave later caught up with, but they had the sort of more sophisticated campaign, at least at the beginning . And these people have been preparing for this moment the, whole of their political lives. Okay . And I think sometimes we the mechanics of how this happened as well as the big geostrategic thing were really important as well. I want to come onto the campaign and the third part, just before I prepare . I was going to ask each of you to take one each . Now I would say my view is the referendum was lost the day it was announced, but a lot of people think the crucial moment was Gove and then Johnson backing leave. Now I know Gove a bit. I imagine the two of you know him really well and Miranda you probably do quite from education from education . Yeah . I'd never had any doubt that Gove would back Lee from my we used to do a prone together called Head to Head and it was quite clear where he stood . And were you surprised when he backed? No Leip? No, no. Absolute lever to his fingertips. Fingertips. And that's obviously why that's obviously why he tried to talk Cameron out of holding the referendum. It was almost like, don't don't make me do this . And it's no it's a very interesting dynamic that friendship at the time. I remember remember writing something on a telegraph like years and years ago about the day that it was snowing in Westminster. Forgive me if I've mentioned this before . And it was one camera used to make videos. Do you remember what he'd do is webcam? Webcam. Webcam. And they had now this shows you how long ago it was. Carol Vorderman was being produced to be the Tory's Maths Czar , right? This is when they're in opposition. And was she a Tory at that point? No, she wasn't a Tory but she wasn't. She was in favor of more maths in schools and it was before or her . She was on a political journey . And of course, the snow meant that this press conference thing was cancelled. So they had to go outside. This video has been wiped by the way from the archives. They had to go outside with Carol Vorderman and David Cameron and Michael Gove looking a bit nervous. And they proceeded to have a snowball fight and it was treated as a great laugh, but of course quite a lot of the snowballs were directed at Michael which was you could see sort of you know Cameron's an alpha male thing. Of course he's going to hit his friend with snowballs and then Gov is gonna kind of nurse nurse that maybe I don't know for ten years or something. But my point okay my point is a scoop the real source of the rose about smell I just think I just think it is, I mean if David Cameron was here to tell me I'm being completely ridiculous but I think so often with alpha male characters like that , that they're not necessarily the most emotionally intelligent when it comes to interpreting what their friends and allies are actually really thinking. And you're right, Steve. I mean, how is it that we 've from different perspectives all I've known Michael Go for a very long time . There was no way he was ever going to back remain. In a million years. No way. Whereas Tim, Boris Johnson, I think was and is different different . The other day for Rizawenta, I read the telegraph article he did publish coming out for Brexit. You know when he wrote the deal ended up publishing the Brexit one and it's fascinating because his argument is by campaigning for out , it will then give us leverage to negotiate a better position to stay in. So even his out article was ambiguous. And given the hard Brexit he ended up negotiating with Lord Frosty Frost, I find that interesting but you knew him well, you worked with him for a time . Is that right, do you think that he was always very different from Goe in his approach to this. I think I'm going to say something so shocking now you're going to be shaken to your core. But there may have been political motivation That's what Boris Johnson was doing . And the point that he was articulating earlier that this would settle the question . It was never going to settle the question. No, never going to settle the question. And I know that wasn't your point. It was Cameron's argument, but yeah, the idea of course I think it's possible . And we also had the shell shocked morning of the referendum result, didn't we? Where it was clear Gov and Boris had no real plan . And I think Michael Matthew Elliott of the Vote Leave campaign has written a book for the tenth anniversary in which he's published the speeches that Gove and Boris were going to give accepting defeat . And they were prepared apparently and the victory speeches weren't . And I think Boris's thought was he would lead what was the majority opinion on the Tory side on the right wing of British politics, that they wanted to leave the European Union. They would have a valiant feat and he would go on to pick up the pieces and lead the Tour party . And that's the one side that I think probably people are most familiar with . What I do know I'm not in touch with Boris anymore. We fell out very publicly . What I do think is fair to say of Boris since the referendum is he's never reviled from his commitment to Brexit. He's always backed it. He's never said it was a mistake. He's always defended, he's always upheld it, and he's continued to advance it. So whatever may have been his motivations when he made that stance , he has been a true believer ever since. I think his former wife Marina has a big part in that story . But to be fair to him , he think he's probably a convert to the course . You can't anyway, you can't disown it having done it. It's like Tony . Oh, Boris could have been capable of anything he could. You think he could have disowned it. Let's take a break and then we'll briefly reflect on the differing c ampaigns . Hello and welcome back to Not Another One, where we are looking back I still can't hunt, believe it was ten years ago, but at the same time yes,, it seems like ancient history. Miranda , the remain campaign was, on the whole, a disaster . But I wonder whether part of the trap is it was doomed to be I recommend watching the Norma Percy series. It's on the BBCI player if you missed it when it was broadcast on Monday evening . But they had Stuart Rose reminiscing about and he was the launch of the Britain In campaign . And he said, I didn't want to do it. I knew I'd be hopeless . But they kept on coming up to me and say, You are the one who could win this. And he changed his speech at the last minute . Anyway, the whole thing was a disaster. It began as a disaster . But I wonder whether there was any around it , because for example, at each point they were so scared of being the establishment when they could pick up this kind of anti politics mood. So one thing they were thinking of doing is getting all the living prime ministers to do a rally . And they right away . That's why they persuaded Blair and Major just to go to Northern Ireland to talk about the peace process and how Brexit would threaten it. They didn't want the prime minister's back . So who do you get to back it that appears chime with the kind of anti politics mood that you could tangibly feel at that period. So I wonder whether there was a good remain campaign. They were doomed well at the start. So I think a lot of this is very interesting in terms of the Labour Party, isn't it as well? Because in the Indie Ref in twenty fourteen , the Unionist side had done this, you know, united front for the Union thing , and the Labour Party had felt that it was really damaging and that sharing platforms with the Conservatives particularly during Indie Ref had been one of the things that had gone wrong for them in the twenty fifteen general election, I mean, you know, whether or not that's right or whether the Labour Party was doomed in the twenty fifteen election in Scotland anyway, who knows, but they felt that really strongly, and I remember because Allan Johnson, you remember, was trying to organise the labour contribution. He was in charge for the remaining side and he had an absolute nightmare . Not least because Jeremy Corbyn was leader of the Labour Party and that left flank of the Labour Party has always been very much in two minds about Britain's membership anyway, but also because of the just sort of bad relations inside the Labour Party. The factionalism was appalling. He couldn't get the Corbyn operation to do anything and felt a lot of them on the Labour Front Bench that they shouldn't repeat that experience in Scotland and they shouldn't be part of any sort of cross party united front for European membership. And so it was very, very bitty. There was a lot of money, there were a lot of people with supposed expertise , but it felt really directionless. And then of course they tried to replicate the message that had worked at the last minute in Scotland, which was known as Project Fear , which is basically trying to tell people, well, you know, this is a cold, hard calculation about your prosperity and what will happen to, you know, some sort of equivalent of the pound in your pocket which just came over as unbelievably arrogant when the tone of the campaign on the other side was emotion . Yeah, I went to a Labour for Europe rally and it really was very funny. Alan Johnson came on and said thank you all for coming to Labour for Europe. We are the only party completely united behind good effort, AJ here to explain why is our leader, Jeremy Corbyn. And then Jeremy Corbyn came on and said, The treatment of the EU towards Greece, Greece is an absolute disgrace . And by the way, we plan to nationalise the railways come what way and we believe in public ownership and if Brussels tries to stop us we will go ahead anyway vote remain and Alan Johnson then walked on looking at one hundred and fifty . So now you know why labour is fully behind . And it was one of the many emblematic examples of the kind of internet they never got it. You should get into comedy. Right . I'm live on Allen listens, by the way, hello, Alan. Oh, that was he's spoken about the problems he had at Jeremy Corbyn's office to work with with this particular campaign. In fairness, Jeremy Corby, you could argue that his position was in with question marks probably closer to the British public than a lot of other positions, but we won't go into that now . What? But so they were kind of trapped the whole remain establishment. It was stymied, I think. And it had one hand held behind its back . And then I think that this just sort of cold hard emphasis a , you know, the economics came over as very, very arrogant and talking down to the population, not least because George Osborne by then was very unpopular, of course. Osborne as the austerity chancellor telling people that this was a danger to how well off they were going to feel didn't go down well. Also I hesitate to raise this because it's a very sensitive issue, but a week before polling day we had the murder of Joe Cox and an awful event Brendan has become a friend is a widower since those times and I know what he's going to face over the next week or so he remembers all of that . It did change the final week of the campaign though . Lots of things that for example the remaining campaign had planned, including warnings from Mark Carney, then the Governor of the Bank of England , they shelved all of it and it all became this sort of homage and sensitive about love. I can't remember the expression that they used do you remember? But it was something Matt Hancock and people they're all wearing stickers about love not I can't remember what it was, but it was in a sense that the campaign that that final week lost all of its the character it would have had. Now it may not have made any difference , but in my in my gut I have this idea that the believers didn't like the idea that somehow the arguments were being taken away and being this was being put in place . And the remainers who could have been making a full throttled economic case against leaving, we could have seen market reaction as a didn't make that case . And what never happened of, course in, the run up to that result because the consensus was that we would stay where there was never any market turbulence. Now if there had been market turbulence in anticipation of a league victory , the public may have thought if the mark ets we're going to carry on and vote the way we want to. Or they may have thought , I think, particularly people like my own family much more cervative would have reacted differently . And so I feel I feel sort of slightly awful raising it, but actually I think the death of Joe Cox was a was a moment in that campaign. It was an unbearable moment, unbearable. And maybe it did change the d ynamic of the last few days. What's interesting going back to this normal Percy programme is I do like her. She is an incredible figure. She's very frail and yet produces these documentaries . Ian, I had forgotten the degree of kind of civil war at different points in the two outcomes, not just between the two outcamp aigns , but the attempt to get rid of Dominic Cummings from the establishment of the other out campaign to the point where he was sacked and then Gov and others had to intervene to get him put back in. So we've got two versions really, haven't we of that campaign? We've got the Benedict Cumberbatch rather romantic portrayal of Dominic Cummings James Graham's film of a dramatized film. Yeah just, a lot of it just plainly just untrue. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, it's sort of what in terms of elevating the account the account of events. I mean it's a coming up but the story about the coming up with the slogan Takeback Control was just was that someone else? Just not true. Who was it? Because it was very clever case. Well, this is there are key words, especially the back, as everyone has said. There are there are competing versions of it, but I think if you read M atthew Elliott's new book, you'll discover that it's not as portrayed in that film. Right. It's almost as if lots of people wanted to claim credit for it. Yeah, which wouldn't have done if the campaign had failed, but of course, but yeah it's but this I mean what you describe goes sorry to go backwards but it goes right back even to the argument over the designation so you had a there was a fight over which of the campaigns was going to be the official campaign and qualify for all the Dosh and you know the right to the right to be the lead and until quite you know it was actually Farage and Banks thought that they were going to get that. I do think history could have been quite different actually if I mean I would have I would have really struggled and I'm an instinctive leaver . I would have struggled with an official Aaron Banks Nigel Farage Led campaign. So there had to be an alternative campaign. And but as Tim said earlier, the way it didn't seem so at the time as a Eurosceptic it just seemed like they were all they were all fighting and it was all completely pointless and it was undermining the campaign . Actually, it meant that it was a very it was disputious but it was a very big tent and you had different you had a different it was complementary. Yeah. Yeah, exactly . And a different style of campaign which appealed to different voters or could reach parts of the electorate people that didn't vote, for example , that brought in votes for for leave . And then actually , you know, I mean Cummings Cummings , you know, maybe, you know, made some mistakes in that campaign , but also it was it was a genius insurgent campaign. It wasn't just down to Dominic Cummings, it was down to Matthew Elliott and all sorts of other people in the official leave in the official leave campaign. I mean, I Tim mentioned a Joe Cox thing. I mean, I thought it was such a horrific event. I actually I thought as a leaver that that would really change the dynamic, that would that would taint the entire thing, chang theed the changed mood in the country and various people said to me don't be don't be mad. It's completely this is a terrible terrible terrible event but it won't impact on how people vote and it didn't in the end. The other the other thing we 'll often forgotten had a big impact on me. I wrote about it within two hours of him saying it and got the biggest response I probably got to anything ever written was when Obama did his back of the queue thing. That was so stupid remain but because that was a that was a great I'm trying to explain people who there will be people listening to the same what do you mean that was Barack Obama telling the truth? If you're a leaver, I'm trying to explain the Leavers thought process. This was the president of the United States who, for all his talents was a bit smug. And this was partly about for Leavers settle, you know, settling scores with a smug establishment. And they actually produced the president of the United States to say back of the queue. And it was, well, right, you really think so . And that's why I wonder whether, you know, in Tim's telling of the joke, the cancelling the Mark Carney inter vention and the rest of it. Maybe that just would have had the same effect as the Barack Obama intervention. You see, maybe yes or not. That's what I mean about establishing the remain campaign being trapped. I mean, if you step back a second, not y, it's very dowdy as well. But also , in theory, not bad to get a popular president of the United States backing your campaign , but Ian's absolutely right. It's completely counterproductive, which makes me wonder whether there was anything they could do to win this. Well that Obama, you know, great vote winner popular in Britain and it works against them. And I can't remember the phrasing now, but it was like back of the line or back of the queue. Back at back of the queue. But whatever he said he would have been wrong, he was either either he had been sucking up to us by using an English expression or he was using I think they were I think there was an awful lot to what Miranda just said actually . And that shows how number ten again was Mr in the mood. They were celebratory that night. They thought this is a clincher. We've got this charismatic president backing us and of course it had the opposite impact. But also your point about the brilliance of the takeback control slogan. I remember talking to somebody who was an ardent remainer had been sort of on the outskirts of the campaign and couldn't kept using the slogan that had been the slogan for the indie ref unionist side. You know, even the people involved in the campaign couldn't remember. I think it was stronger in wasn't stronger together. Stronger, stronger together, I think better together. Better together for Scotland here. One of the yeah, better together and stronger in. Yeah. And lots of people involved in the stronger in campaign kept saying best together. They couldn't even remember their own slogan, you know ? Whereas take back control, there's no ambiguity . Yeah. It is a very powerful phrase. I think there is ambiguity about the phrase. Who's who what agency is taking I mean I mean as a piece of political messaging you know you don't doubt I mean if you say what's the what's the slogan of the of the leave campaign Yeah pretty much anyone is politically engaged in that Dan Kia Stammer adopted it later on. He did. He did . Yes, in another context of that. I think it didn't last very long in that context. But this is feeling this is a fascinating discussion and it is it's feeling almost as though we needed part two on what happened. Come on let's rel ive more of that let's relive more of these wonderful days that we've got through the decision to hold it and we have got up to the campaign s and the day. And what we now need a part two on, which we'll do next week. So press the subscribe button if you're not subscribing is to analyze what followed And in a way, even though we all and all of you listening, live through it, because things move so fast, I think some of it's been under analyzed, that hung parliament, especially after twenty seventeen. And as Sim said, it's all about Europe. I was wrong. I misphrased it when I said Europe wasn't Europe was huge Leaving was not high up in the voters concerned, slightly different We need to illustrate that too with a picture of me pontificating wisely at an event in Miranda looking at me. Do you remember that picture There is a famous Well actually it was the anniversary three years on and Tim and I were invited by K and a changing Europe, the think tank to reflect wisely on what we had learned over this Liar . Do you remember that? Somebody in the first front row just kept shouting liar at me for two hours and Tim and I, yeah, we had words, didn't we? And there's a famous picture of me kind of rolling my eyes as you know, you know We managed our friendship survives. Well, I'll tell you while we're reminiscing briefly, I wrote a column for the guard sayiansing how the Tory party was becoming benite on Europe and accountability to local parties and all the rest of it . And Michael Govan went around with a badge saying I'm a benefit. He had an Ima Blair thing and became I a Bennite. I got invited Cameron to address Tory MPs at their away day on this very theme, which when you think about is quite delicate , but maybe I can tell you what happened next time. So part two, we're going to look at what was followed next. Thanks so much for listening. Bye bye