Immediate Risks for the New Government

Trump Modi Orban. That's the trifecta name checked by commentators whenever they want a quick way of gesturing to the authoritarian nationalist wave which has swept global politics over the last decade and a half . But as of 12th of April this year, one element of that unholy trinity, Victor Orban, has fallen from power. His opponent, Pitta Mad jar, a former member of Orban's party Fides, often describ ed as a conservative liberal, led a united opposition to a landslide victory. Um, having campaigned strongly against corruption and on the rule of law, Mad jar's party, TISA, uh obtained fifty-three per cent of the vote, enough for a two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly, thus allowing him a pretty free hand in remaking the country. Orban, of course, had long been the darling of the international right, funding a transnational network of propagandists and influencers. Domestically, he was accused of an increasingly personalist politics, remaking the Constitution and overseeing a kleptocratic mafia state in which Orban aligned companies and families, including his own, robbed the state blind. A champion of so called illiberal democracy, Orban fre frequently attacked and undermined the rule of law, and sought out conflict with the European Union and engendered a paranoid style of politics with a proliferating range of enemies, from gender theorists and LGBT people to Islam, from Europoliticians and NGOs to the Central Europe an University, and of course George Soros. Over the past decade and a half his politics got harder and harder, and the corruption more flagrant and more obvious and autonomics um unravelled So one reading of the election is that a wave of anti incumbency swept the nation. His people were simply sick of it. Never again a country without consequences, said Maj ar. He has a substantial task ahead of him, made easier by that majority. One factor of course is those institutions which are still populated by Orban cronies, many of them with very long term appointments. And so that is to say changing the state is of course more complex than just winning an election. Another question is what precisely Majar's politics are? In contrast to the authoritarian populism of Orban and his friends, he campaigned on a democratic populism and swerved many of the cultural war issues that Orban relishes. Many will hope that he behaves like some sort of new Cincinnatus called from his plough to restore uh the functioning of the state , but there are many temptations which arise from a state apparatus which gives significant discretionary power to whoever's at the top. It was of course once Victor Orban, after all, who gave grand speeches in favour of democracy, the spirit of eighteen forty eight and nineteen fifty six, very famously at the reburial of Imre Naj and Comrades during the Liberation of 1989. You're listening to On Politics on the LRB podcast. I am James Butler. And with me to talk about the fall of Orbanism and what comes next is Daniel Nolan, who's written extensively about Hungary's politics as well as the international right-wing apparatus set up by Orban. And in the studio with me is the Hungarian British poet, translator and keen observer of the Orban catastrophe, George Sietesh. George, if I can start with you, I know you were in Budapest for election night. Uh and I'm sure uh you saw many much of the celebrations uh across the city. I know many listeners will have seen those images uh arriving as well. Give me just some sense of the popular mood that evening. Well popular mood had I think decided that Majar was going to win . We were on our way to a friend to actually watch the election results come in, and that meant a journey past Parliament Square, Cosh with Laoshtier, which was filled with young people and booming music. It felt like rave. It really was in a way. Um and they were definitely anticipating victory. And I suspect they were one of the causes of the victory. Th there were new voters, young voters, and they were all set up for it. So there was celebration in the streets before the And then once the count was over, then f people in the streets drinking, singing, waving to the police, and so on. So it felt like a regime change. Oh yes. Absolutely. Well, if somebody's been there for sixteen years, um and there seemed to be no hope of change, because what had changed really? Um then it was like an enormous release. It was joy. I mean we stayed there for a few more days and everywhere there was this sigh of happiness. And he's come into uh Marja, he's immediately come into confrontation with the old apparatus. He's he's really said that he's intending to to clear house. Has anything surprised you in his sort of first few days uh post-election Well everything really. That's what it was, and the state radio. Um he was basically faced um by the very people who had refused him entrance to the studios and who had slandered him, who had hinted that there was some divide between him and his children, which there isn't, in the very same studios by the same people. So when he faced them, um he had no time for them whatsoever. They kept trying to ask him statesmanlike questions. I'm just a political journalist. I'm just a I'm asking the questions that everybody wants to know. Well you have no right to ask me those questions. You yourselves I'm you have been corrupt for all these years um and you're gonna have to go s as soon as possible. And that was so direct. You don't usually get that. I mean y you might get that in a funnily enough, in a dictatorship. So it might come, well, you know, that journalist, that journalist, that journalist, you're out. Um and we'll have that one in. So it was a confrontation, I think, that was um in a way it hardly matters what the interviewer asked. Whatever issue, but she wanted to know, what are you going to do? And his answer seemed to be is get rid of you . Um it was it was quite shocking, but exhilarating, because that is what many people have actually wanted to do. So he was emb odying a reaction that was there in the vote. And um so he didn't get much about policy from it. I mean interestingly in in one sense that sounds almost Trumpian, right? It sounds like but it sounds like the early Trump, the Trump of the sort of twenty sixteen campaign, who who lots of people felt that that he channelled the uh hostility they felt or the the the dislike they felt of of the mainstream press. Yeah, well that's something we'll have to be careful of . Because um there isn't a long unbroken tradition of democracy in the countr y. And sometimes I thought they actually rather like their strong men at the top, you know. Gives them a sense of security and pride. So he'll have to watch that. He made a speech after he won, and in that speech, which wasn't at all a Fidesz sounding speech, although he of course emerged out of Fidesz , it sounded like a very liberal speech. It was the commitments he made were broad , um , but he was definitely going to pick up on corruption, and he was looking to bring people to the la Dan if I can come to you I I I I wonder if you can give us a sense of the the politics of of this election and maybe um what I've missed out in my very brief account there at the start of of uh aubanism in particular. So that period that is just now perhaps at an end ? Well, I think that over all this was won and lost on the economy . Um Orban ran a organomics, let's say, went quite well for until roughly 2019, but then it took a big hit from COVID from Ukraine, um very high inflation, the highest in Europe . And that was accompanied by real problems with uh hospitals, schools and so on, which are kind of starting to look a little bit tired and dilapid ated. And um ya avoided the culture wars and just ran on, you know, like you say, rule of la w and um an economy. And um that was what most Hungarian observers, Hungary observers had had always said that eventually it will be won on the economy and that's how it turned out. So I mean I I it's worth saying maybe what that sort of organ omics um is, because one of the things that I think is was really interesting in the the campaign um was that as far as I could tell Majar has promised to basically retain all of the sort of all bound era fiscal transfers and sort of uh various sort of uh you know welfare payments to uh of one kind or another. Um so there's a s there's there's sort of a there's there's certainly a continuity there in terms of re remittances. So that's one side of the organ omics thing. The other is bringing industry into the the country. So Hungary has a sort of strong industrial manufacturing base and it's it's certainly despite the sort of uh politics of sovereignty, it's also to some extent, as I understand it, relied on German manufacturing and particularly automobiles, and then I think increasingly Chinese and Korean companies as well. So what's what's Major's relationship to to that kind of uh economic stun? Well, that's I mean that is very interesting because that that's right, there's been a lot of Chinese investment, uh Korean investment , there's a BYD uh factory, which is pretty much ready to go in Saged in South Hungary. There's a uh a cattle battery plant in Debretsen too. And um and there's a lot of balls in play that Modial will now have to deal with. You know, we're talking about w does does he keep these these contracts , um which actually you know were signed were signed by the Orban government. And also, you know, there's the the the EU aspect, there's the green goals, you know, there's it's a it's a kind of complicated en envirvirononment for him and speaking of which it became an actual election liability for Orban because around these around these uh E V plants and the and the uh B E V plants has been like really quite shocking levels of environmental damage . That became something that was one of the main election issues. So um I think it I think we're talking about in the last five years about 17 billion was in was invested in Hungary from China and Korea . And that only only Indonesia had had more investment. So it's obviously it's very, very important for the Hungarian economy. And and uh inherits that situation. And I I suppose the other element here and I think it's one that that has had maybe more attention is the role of European structural funds, right? So the the accusation here, and I think it you know it's pretty well supported, is that that those uh payments from the European Union, and the European Union has withheld I think it's twenty seven point three billion euros um in in structural funds for Hungary because of the way that these were being used for um uh client relationships, patronage um by the s by the Orban uh uh regime. And so the claim the uh the the uh it you know it seems to me that Major has made a priority of uh intending to get that that that cash flowing again. Uh do you have a sense, Dan, how easy that will be? It will not be easy. And the and the the the clock is ticking on it. So the deadline for that is 31st of August. And there are certain milestones. I saw 27 milestones quoted, um which he will he will have to, you know, while actually launching a government, he will have to deal with this and it's gonna take a lot of the government bandwidth in the in the few first few months. So far what we've heard really in terms of what Madhyar has said has mostly been anti-corruption. Um like George said he went to the state media and took and gave them what for. Basically, anyone who voted TISA is expecting a win on this. I mean, this is this was central to his campaign. So yeah, I think there's there is some pressure on but the general news from Brussels seems like they are quite keen to you know to help in in the process or to help the TISA government in the process. Right. I mean, and certainly I guess from the European perspective, there's a this this is a potential big win if you're say Ursula von der Leyen or someone like that. This is a I think in fact von der Leyen's response to the action it was you have chosen Europe. Um so there's a there's a political uh uh win for them there if they can if they can sort this. But I mean Madiari's a it's not all ban, that's that's immediately a win for him too. Well uh Ursula van der Leyen and Zelen sky were the chief um uh figures on Orban's posters. I mean in the previous election it was Soros. In this it was a sort of underline and always the threat was it is it was the call to paranoia which they've been playing on and which is quite easy to play on in Hungary, I think, um is that if you would for these people, life is going to be far far, worse. So your biggest enemies are uh the EU and Ukraine. And you know, Ukraine, the Ukraine army is going to come and invade Hungary. Um And ridiculous things like in fact they were so ridiculous that I think that was part of the reason that it uh it didn't hold water at all. And it it it it seems to me the case that I I don't know I don't know uh the uh all the detail on it, but it seems to me that that um he, Maj ar has been very reluctant to um to move positions on the two kind of hot but ton issues um that Orban traded on in relationship with the EU, both uh migration. So he said that he will retain the the sort of anti-migration or or kind of hostilities to the migration pact that has characterised the Hungarian position for the for the last decade or so and is uh very sceptical about support for Ukraine. Uh I don't know whether that's a broad uh or too broad an an assessment. Well I don't think he intends to block support for Ukraine. Um and as to immigration, yes, that that is well it's a hot issue everywhere in Europe, of course . Um I was there in 2015 where the Syrian refugees were gathered at one of the main railway stations and when they started uh railing them off in in tra ins. It's a very split country. I mean uh in a way it it's an urban versus rural country, as in many places. Um the Syrian refugees had a lot of support for my Budapest population . But I think he just pushed out too far with the suggesting that Zelensky and Wolfrevendrale are in some kind of cabal against patriotic Dan I know you've written uh about migration and and uh Orban's use of migration politics. What do you what do you make of the state of the debate uh over the course of this election and and its aftermath? Well I mean if if we can go back where George George mentioned twenty fifteen . I remember the beginning of that year, the UDS were in deep trouble. Um they were polling about 20% to the point where their communications guy actually was inviting foreign correspondents, which is you know, transparency was never a priority for them. We actually got one-to-one meetings with Zoltan Kovac because they were so stuck for a talking point. But that let's say if this is February 2015, around that time, the Kosovars were starting to work out the second half of the route that the Syrians would would take later in the year. And Fidas just ran on that anti-migration ticket really all the way to the next elec tion. So like three years, basically. But it's it it's it's been central to them, but this time they repeated the uh the 2022 election campaign, which was basically saying, you know, if you don't vote for us, you're gonna be sent to Ukraine and die. And so that's kind of what FIDES were for the first time they were running on the same ticket with two elections on the road. So migration as far as I see it wasn't really uh a central central uh theme this time. I was reading about the the the unit set up by uh the government, the sovereignty protection organiz ation, this uh uh sort of rather strange unit which is you know uh intended to root out foreign interference uh of various kinds, both uh in media and in elections and sort of in NGOs. So there's this kind of sort of strong how is that received domestically? Is it is it understood as a kind of uh you know, desperate electoral grab and and attempt to induce paranoia, or is there a sort of strong constituency um that worries about sort of foreign interference in domestic politics? I think th th there aren't so many people who actually think about that. And it got to the point where, you know, I mean it's quite telling that Madi ar's kind of first move was to say, don't be scared. And and the there's been a kind of climate of fear around Fides , the n the you know, uh the the Orban system for really for most of the 16 years, really. And I think people just got tired of it. Um that's that's what happened in terms of this this this obviously mentioned people just increasingly asso associated with you know are we are we Putinists now ? Are we Russia now? And um there's been you know like attacks on NGOs for a good a good 10 years and so on. It's just kind of more of the same, but it was kind of coales cing into an office. And um people, especially younger voters, just don't want that anymore. Yeah. I mean one thing is worth mentioning eighteen forty eight, nineteen fifty six, all of that. I mean Hung Hungary is a small country surrounded by bigger countries. It hasn't been in charge of its own government only on rare occas ions. The language is isolated. So there is a natural vein to be touched, and I think the fear of foreign interference or of foreign influence, it's kind of easier than it is here. Because that is the history of Hungary. So there is that there is that vein which is hasn't gone away with Magyar. I mean it's still there. So he has to tread carefully with that. Um I don't think he's suddenly going to be throwing open the borders or or even mentioning the Buddhist particularly um it will be unless so much remains unknown at the moment. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, no, I think it's a it's an interesting period because obviously we're very early early on in this sort of post-post-regime phase, which I think is it brings me nicely, in fact, to my next question, which is to do with uh the concept of illiberal democracy, right? So lots of the way that this stuff has been received and talked about both on left and right internationally has been grappling with the question of what a democratic state looks like when it's helmed by an authoritarian of one kind or another. And there are lots of models for thinking about this and there's lots of interesting scholarship. You know, one of the analyses I like is a is of Orban's period as a an autocratic legalism, right? Where it uh it it passes laws to enable it to to legally behave in an autocratic manner. So there's lots of um legislation that's insulated from um you know ordinary democratic control. It's why it's important that there's a two-thirds majority in Parliament so that there's there's there's more um you know there's been lots of constitution rewriting, things like this. But one of the defenses that's made on the right of the Orban regime is is say, Well, this guy lost an election and he departed. So it's clear that that all this accusation from the left is just hysteria and actually it's all fine and and um Well in a way that the surprise the speech he made on acknowledging his defeat was somber , brief , and for Orban graceful . Um there was no Trump like saying, well that's been miscounted. It's some kind of um illegality has gone on. The idea of a sort of legal state in that sense is if you keep stretching the law , it's a bit like you stretching a piece of elastic. I mean eventually it just breaks and people can see it breaking. And I think it is a it is more than a simple election win. I think it is um a perception that the corruption, blatant corruption you've been living with, um just won't cut it anymore. Somebody once said to me, well I said, I said, uh what do Hungarians think about corruption? And they said and his answer was, well, at least he's a Hungarian. And Dan, can you give us a sense maybe of of how how this sort of corruption works or has worked in practice um under Orban? Because I I you know I think there's uh there's a kind of clear uh you know th there's a general sense of there being patrimony and client you know clientelism and skimming but but is there a is there a clear structure been described it's been described as state capture in reverse in the past because the state appointed the oligarchs rather than the other way round, which is how it normally works. Orban even in the 90s was saying that um that the trick would be to identify eight or ten oligarchs and get them to report uh get them to support your your regime. And he kind of stated the there was like four sectors you need to do this banking, retail, energy, and media. And so it was a definite plan and he you know and he really did capture those. Some of this was so blatant. I mean one of the first things Urban did back in twenty ten is that he gave over major construction contracts to his father. And then he named a gas fitter in his village Velchute, um, as the man who was going to be his bag man, the man who was going to be looking after his money, so he could claim I'm not taking my salary. Um but in the meantime he built a kind of mini Versailles near his village. He's built an enormous set well not enormous, but a football stadium with all the modern comforts, which houses twice as many people as live in the village, and all these are plain to see. So people would have had to say either close their eyes to this or say, well , whatever happens, at least he gives us stability, he gives us our sense of patriotic pride. And he just took over institution over institution. And that's going to be one of Majora's uh great problems. Right. You know, you you you can win an election, but if someone's been building their version of a state for sixteen years, then they have um you know with with little regard for for uh you know sort of separation of powers um you know there's you know an an enormous number of Auburn appointed judges um there's a you know the judiciary is an object of great concern internationally. I think Hungary and Poland are the two that get cited as European cases for concern about the judiciary. And certainly um my understanding is that uh you know much of the media is um or has been sort of uh Orban aligned, as well as so these kind of significant manufacturing companies. . Yes Now some of those kind of big uh you know major capitalist companies have have uh have already said, you know, we're we're happy to work with the new regime um new regime, new government. Um but but you know in the sense that they you know they welcome a kind of clearer rule of law, like it's you know, that's the kind of thing that that business can get behind. Are there other areas where you might see more uh resistance to this sort of change in ratio. Well I think all those institutions um which are soaked in Orban's people . Um there'll be another set of people um who'd be very willing to come in and reset um the situation . But that's uh as we said, it that's going to be really very, very hard . I mean in terms of culture, I mean it's close things. He tried to create a patriotic library, um which uh involved a lot of right wing people from earlier. He has managed to set up friends and channels who have pursued individuals and sent them off into exile into places. And none of this is happening through physical violence. So it looks carries on looking legal. It's just free speech, isn't it? But that will be very hard. But I think at least you could begin with the media because those people, the front people anyway, I should think can be f quickly replaced. Dan, what's your sense? Well it seems like the media is is kind of collapsing of its own accord now, the state media. Um so you know that that's that's that's maybe surprising, but suddenly you know there is there's gonna be no state money coming in for you know advertising revenue and so on. So it just appears to be if we talk about these, you know, four pillars that we mentioned, you know, with retail, banking, etc., then it seems like the media is the is the first pillar to go. It's really happening. One of the things which is worth saying is that what happened with Fidesz is roughly what happened with the Hungarian Communist Party. There are an awful lot of people working for it. But there was no ideology. It was like Morta between Brexit, you could just push them and the wall fell down. And I think the same case with Firasno. And with Major. I mean, I don't know how ideologically committed he was to Urbanism. Um, but you join these things because it's a way of being in politics, it's a kind of career. And if you get that far, you should be quite good at m manipulating that because you've had practice. You're listening to On Politics on the LRB podcast. Stay with us for this very brief commercial break What's your map of podcasts from Oculimundi won gold at the twenty twenty five British Podcast Awards? Oculi Mundi is Latin for eyes of the world and W'hats Your Map feat ures a fascinating range of guests talking about the stories and ideas behind maps that they'd love. Guests this series include the Norwegian explorer Cecilia Skug, who's climbed the world's seven tallest mountains, and Ross Per lin, co director of the Endangered Language Alliance. Every episode is filled with history, culture and conversation. What's your map is hosted by the historian Jerry Broughton, whose books include Aory H ofist theld Wor in Twelve Maps and Four Points of the Compass, and you can zoom into the maps on Oculi Mundi's website, OculiHyphenmundi.com. Subscribe now to What's Your Map available on Apple Spo,ti fy and all major podcast platforms . You're listening to On Politics on the LRB podcast. Uh welcome back. I'm speaking with uh Dan Nolan and George Syotesh uh about the fall of Victor Orban. I wonder if if one of the so one of the places where the ideology may have been thicker is in the kind of astonishing changes to the higher education regime that were made under Auburn. So that involved the the campaign against the Central European University, um and and uh which I think was pretty well publicized here. Um I think there was the there was a lot of outrage and support. But there's also been um the the production of this I think I think it's a private institution, the the Cor vinus Collegium, um which uh it you know has hosted with you know I think, it has a stake in um uh the petrochemical industry, the state petrochemical industry and and sort of receives um money via that. And so it's sort of vastly well funded um off the back of um uh state revenue uh institution which has supported all sorts of sort of rather uh uh sinister international . That's what multiliberalism was. You get rid of these liberal guys and repla themce with our people who are not going to be adopting liberal values. But with with with Orban gone, can it survive? I mean, lots of people seem to think that it's it's going to be a pushover, but it doesn't seem obvious to me that that's the case. Mondial has a actually said in the uh in the in the election programme that that he will investigate MCC and so on. There is also the think tank, the Danube Institute, which had certain fellows. It's generally an Anglophone thing. And that will be easier. You just you just got the funding off. But like you say, you know, um the MCC has 10% stake in Maul, uh 10% stake in Kidean, which is like two of the biggest Hungarian uh companies. So that is a lot more complex procedure. Um but the yeah in terms of in terms of some of them like the CPAC that they were organizing, Dani be Institute, these he can just he can cut off the funding to that. Um with the MCC, much more complicated I think. strange American conservative uh uh rally the CPAC uh uh Europe thing that they did in in in Budapest. It seemed it seemed uh you know amazingly tin eared when you know a country has suffered such really significant stagflation of the kind that Hungary really did for a significant chunk of time post-COVID to host this kind of glitzy but rather um uh tone deaf uh American rally um with you know I mean then then we had of course J.D. Vance popping over. Was it just a a catastrophic misjudgment, Dan ? Um I think it was it was had a negative effect on Hungaria on their polling figures. Um apparently the JD Vance visit saw Fidas drop three points in the polls . So , you know, I mean Orban Orban is the guy. He had, you know, maybe the only other leader of the world who was kind of close with Trump, Putin, and G and Hungarian voters have spoken and they don't care who he has on speed speed dial. No, I mean I thought I thought that was i interesting because there's uh sort of fear that uh if you can demonstrate international influence then um you know voters will stick with that because you look powerful. And it seems to have been pretty pretty demonstra you know demonstrably rejected um as But where does this leave that sort of international network of figures? I mean it you know I it I'm I'm hesitant, you know, I I was I think saying before we w we started speaking on air, you know, I'm I'm always hesitant to read elections in terms of what they mean for, you know, uh international observers uh rather than what they mean domestically. Um it's a bad trait of the British left to do that. But it, you know, it nonetheless interests me that that a really significant link in the chain, which seemed at s at one point you know completely immovable. It seemed like Orban was going to be there forever. It seemed like that there, you know, that that this was going to be a sort of a key part of a sort of reactionary international that was just not going to to be dislodged. Um and yet it has. So what about everyone else? I mean, because at one point Kuczynski in Poland said, well we're gonna build Budapest Budapest in in Warsaw. Uh Budapest is coming to Warsaw. Um you know there there's all sorts of people who've been funded um by these guys. Are they going to follow the the Kaczynski sort of Polish uh uh uh habit in opposition, which is to find a way to abstract everything, complain , to to sort of uh you know uh find a way to to undermine um you know the the foreign government or or you know what can we expect from them? From people who are I mean the likes of Trumps and so forth. Yeah yeah. Well they feel it is a serious wound because um they were kind of Trump and Orban was mini me, but which was mini and which was me wasn't always clear because Orban got there first, of course, and he declared his illiberal democracy before Trump came to power. I don't know how far it'll affect Trump world. I think Trump world if it uh blows up it'll have blown itself up rather than anything else. Um there's always a right-wing strain and at different times in history these will become more important because of I mean immigration is a major issue and that is on the whole a right wing issue. So if you are wary of it you will probably be gravitating towards those who are against it. In nineteen eighty nine, when I was there for most of a year , uh we went to a party in one of the major city parks where new political parties took up trestle tables and had little leaflets to give out. There were over 50 new political parties. Clearly, most of them were going to disappear and did disappear. But if you look at the shifting ground of Hungarian politics, the governing par ty and the opposite party, um there is there is a sense of shift. I mean it could be that um there used to be this party um called Yop ik um which was the f at the far right part of which began to move towards the middle, which scared um Orban , and they managed to get rid of them. But there these these forces are at play within Hungary. I think there is a generational difference. I think young people, especially those who have been to university, have travelled abroad, have worked abroad, are essentially internationalist and they see their own salvation in a way, in something which is not trapped by America and by the likes of Qi and so forth. Um, but which is instinctively Europe an. Well, Vienna, well, you know, Bratislava used to be Hungarian capital Bratislava. So there are emotional ties um which I think now have with some luck um may have pushed aside the grand patriotic gestures of the last sixteen so years. It doesn't mean that those instincts you not have vanished. It just that I think it's associated with a certain generation and that generation . Um I just had to look at the people around Orban when he when he made his acceptance speech . Lots of grey middle aged men, basically, about twelve or thirteen around time. And you looked at Majars, absolute huge crowds and many, many young people. So I think that may be a good sign If I can uh ask a question I I building on that and and come to you, Dan . You know we those of us who've sort of watched Hungarian politics, you much more closely than I, um over the years, have had kind of cause to wonder about why the opposition movement found it so hard to coalesce in various ways or find a kind of coherent uh politics or a candidate um to stand um or or or to succeed. And it seems to you know, that opposition movement seemed to have had many, many kind of full starts, many dead ends. Um it you know, it its eventual figurehead uh ends up being uh a former Fidesz member and as as George has pointed out, it might well be that in a a state in which like there is only really one party that that has kind of effective power, that produces or attracts all kinds of political talent. But uh in the latest issue of the LRB, there's a short piece by Jan Vernemullah on the election, and he observes that um, you know, it's uh it's an observable fact not just in Hungary but in a number of states that um you know, it's the the left and the centre left who are willing to kind of uh find some kind of compromise with a you know, uh you know, uh a centre or centre right candidate and stand behind them in order to to move against the regime. And it's quite hard to find um uh political movements on the right who are willing to make that compromise in reverse. So this is a sort of slightly long winded way of asking um what the status of of those kind of political strains say to the left of someone like Majar is in Hungary or are they just not uh simply not uh i in any state worth speaking of? Well as we as we said, you know, there's three right wing parties in the parliament now. I think it's a it's about a hundred years since there's no there's no uh left of centre party in the Hungarian parliament. I mean this is a broad coalition that Mahdyar has set up. So some of them will be looking to perhaps help TISA a bit as part of a grand coalition. Um in terms of the left, I'm not sure there is such a huge I mean the there are some leftists in in Hungary, but they tend to be maybe Budapest, a couple of other cities, you know, Segar, Debredzun. Um but and they've kind of coalesced around this partisan uh site, which is you know the one that initially took the Mahdiar interview. So but I I'm not sure at present there is a huge kind of you know Hungarian left speak of the U And can I ask additionally like his relationship to the the the um the because I'm I can't I don't have a read on it, but it seems to me that he's been quite hostile or or one of the the things that that helped him succeed was his hostility to the established opposition, right? He's been a bit quite critical of of opposition movements over the years and actually hasn't didn't align himself with them while campaigning. Didn't reject their support if they threw their support behind him, but uh but didn't want to make himself out to be in continuity with that. Was that an important part of the the campaign? Yeah, I think so. I mean we're talking about um I mean Jobbing, the far right party, were actually part of the you know the United opposition uh in the previous election. So I mean as so there have there have been examples of um of right-wing parties taking part. But I would say that Mahdiar has benefited from the fact that it's not the first time that the opposition have just said, okay, let's just have a go, we'll try and get a candidate in there. And then we can sort of hit reset on urban ism. Um so he benefited from that. That's happened in the last, the previous two elections too. And there was a lot more, you know, there was a lot more debate and a lot more to and fro about, you know, who's gonna be the candidate. Uh do we really wanna be in the same uh in the same uh electoral coalition with these people? So that work was already done and and Muddy , yeah, just kind of splipped in later in the day, you know. I I think you shouldn't forget that there was a governing socialist party, so called Socialist Party in Hungary after 1989 . And that Durchan, who was a previous prime minister to Orban , had actually a majority. And there's only the fact that he endured a scandal in which he admitted lying to the nation that he kind of vanished and it's been as a major mission of Orban to completely destroy Du chine. So in a way the social ist instinct wouldn't push it very far, but I think there was a socialist liber al kind of constituency there. Um but it was brought into um disrepute partly by these scandals. But it doesn't mean it's and of course we mustn't forget that all these little ragtag parties um they had no exposure to the public . Um they had no press, they had no media, um they had no money. Um so they could squabble amongst themselves. And there were hop es of some of them, um, but they all failed. And in a way once everything keeps failing, people tend to give up on an idea. I mean I can't really imagine Hungary now be coming a sort of left wing socialist country. Um but the um left wing instincts are not all together dead, I think. Yeah. Yeah. Well I mean I think I mean certainly there's there's obviously uh a kind of strong welfareist uh position, right? I mean, which goes I guess back even to say goulash communism or something like that, right? The the this strong sense of of the state as something that provides or should provide or should, you know, rebalance some of the the the suffering there. So I mean th it's there's there's obviously that but I suppose I guess the other element or and it's worth talking about additionally is you know Maj as , you know, is from this, as I understand it, like quite significant legal jurist family and has like a very strong line in the importance of the rule of law, the importance of kind of institutional functioning, um uh you know, and and I think it has served him really well in these you know, in this campaign. And he seems like a kind of strange figure in one sense, right? So he has this kind of very 19th-urycent , you know, interest in sort of uh liberal virtues like the rule of law, um, while having this kind of quite 21st-century uh campaign sort of coalesce around him, like lots of really cunning use of social media, um, that sort of stuff. I it it's so it's odd in the sense that the the 20th century bit seems almost missing. Um uh but I wonder whether you have a sense of what what he's going to be like when he's confronted with these institutions which are set up and have been set up by Auburn um to really uh invite um whoever's at the top of them to uh you know to use them pretty autocratically because i this seems to me to be like a a pretty significant risk and hard to know how Well I I think a lot depends on momentum. I mean if you take his interviews with the old state media, that's that indicates a lot of momentum and he can use that to try and take on people who are in similar positions in banking and jurisprudence and and so forth. He could go hard in . But I don't know that'll go, um, but that'll probably prop his current wind will propel him some way, and then it depends what happens with Hungary's economy and and how the condition of Hungarians and how far what sort of hopes they have of him. Um because we don't know that. I think the vote was changed. It's a bit like Blair in ninety seven, I think. It's a very similar kind of figure. And almost anything is better than what has come before. And on the power and momentum of that, you can bring about change. How far that energy runs, we'll find out. Dan, what do you make of it? Is there an institutional trap here for someone who's run in this kind of quite this sort of democratic popul ist way. Yeah, I think I think that he has to he has to work out what he can change and what he will have to navigate. Um basically in terms of institu tions . And he, you know, I mean, for example, he I mean he told so you know the the top top judges, the president, they're all in place until twenty twenty nine. So he's potentially got, you know, uh a a president, a constitutional court blocking everything anything that they want . Um as not he he has to deal with that. But but could he use his constitutional power to change that? To cancel contracts or To cancel contracts he could couldn't he but but but like but they could they can block the constitutional changes also can't they have to sign that through so it's kind of a vicious circle um maybe maybe there'll be more backstairs intrigue than we anticipate. Well, I mean this is this is where it comes down to political skill, right, doesn't it? Where where you think, okay, well, uh you know, w what are the fights that are useful to have, right? What what's the fight that allows someone who's who's who has this momentum behind him to come into um uh government and say, it will be politically beneficial for me to pick this fight or this argument. So it you know, we haven't mentioned it, but I think you know the the genesis of his campaign in some ways was this kind of uh quite unpleasant cover-up sex scandal, paopedhil ia um uh abuse scandal, um which propelled him, you know, he he picked that fight well, this fight with his ex wife. Um uh, you know, quite astonishing uh in some ways. But he used that fight as a way of sort of generating moral credibility and things like that. And there are obvious things in terms of corruption that you can certainly do that when you're in government. You know, the way we do it in Britain is you want to buy someone off, you give them a lordship, right? Like you say, okay, I want you to stop doing this and go and I'll put you in the house of lords, and it means I can get you away from the thing that that you're destroying or or damaging or or or screwing up. And I don't know whether there's a there's a way of doing that domestically in Hungary, but is there other fights that it's useful for him to have? Well f firstly I'd say that Brussels is the equivalent of House of Lords if you want to get rid of someone. That definitely happens. Not mentioning any names, Tomas Deutsch. But um but if if if they if they if there is someone who's yeah, a little bit um you know needs to be dealt with. Navacij was also sent off there. But anyway, um so I mean it it seems to be okay with a national bank governor, for example. Um but the you know, some of these oligarchs are quite well known now. So he definitely that would be a huge win for him if he's actually seen as uh you know uh taking on the oligarchs, stopping them from the other foreign transfers and so on, as something that you can do and um and dig dig deeper into it. I mean this is it's essential that he does that because he ran on it. Yeah. I mean mustn't forget that a constitution is actually not very old. And it's been altered fifteen times. It's a fairly brittle um something to build on. And you can probe it and maybe I'm sure he's going to propose changes to it again. And I suspect he might have to do something like that. Because the legality that Orban established Yeah, I mean this is where I I I come back to that question of the sort of institutional trap, right? Where you know you you y you know it's very difficult to to um and you know when when we began um you know I mentioned the the Roman figure Cincinn atus, you know, is this virtuous character who's called from his sort of non-political um job into into government to kind of as dictator, in fact, you know, in in the Roman Republic, um to to restore uh uh Republican virtue is a sort of fantasy, right, about a sort of strongman figure. And things don't work like that really in practice. But it it points out the temptation is that it's very, very difficult when you know particularly when you need to make changes and you have available to you only these methods that are um you know questionably democratic and whether you can resist the sort of mission creep as it were. Well that's sort of Cincinnati's idea . Um Arpad Gantz was president, he was a figure like that. He was a very popular and he did he was seen as a virtuous figure who had come in from completely outside politics and was hope doing his best to put things right. Fiddles were seen as something like that themselves. I remember a conversation in the must be in nineteen ninety with an older rather wonderful poet who's now dead. I said, Who are you going to vote for at the first election? And she said Fides . I said why ? Um they're innocent. They have they haven't brought the hunger hunger's murky past with them. So the idea of finding that kind of figure today I I doubt whether Dan, do you have a sense of of uh you know whether whether this is a thing that is navigable? I mean I I I you know the more we talk about it, the more sort of immense a task it actually seems well the two the two thirds helps for sure. If we'd won a simple majority, then that would just be a complete mess, I think. I think that would be total total gridlock. But the but the the uh the two thirds gives him plenty of leverage and he has a huge mandate. So um you know it's it's not ideal but it could be worse. Yeah. Um okay, I I have a s I have a I have a a slightly different question. It's it it's it's it's prompted by George's reference to history and I suppose one of the the things that maybe actually you can say, you know, is one of the few commonalities between Orban and Majai is they both have they're both interested in articulating you know a very sort of distinctive vision and you know very distinct visions of Hungarian history. And I wonder if you um either of you or both of you have a sense of you know because Hungary, I mean it's you know, as as George has alluded to, it is a is a country that has changed shape a lot over the It's like an amoeba keep splitting . And you know this you know obviously there's there there are kind of toxic ways that can manifest politically, a sort of irredentism, um, you know, a pining for past glories. And I say this sitting in an you know an old imperial capital myself, and this is a syndrome that afflicts British politics as much as anything else, is pining after past glories. But there's also unlike in Britain, a pretty clear sort of liberal and emancipatory political history in Hungary as well. And you know, eighteen forty eight is the obvious one, nineteen fifty-six is the obvious one, as is nineteen eighty nine. So what how how would you know how important were those visions of the nation, you know I think it's always going to be important because of history. Because here you are yes, we're sitting in imperial capital, but it's been that way for a very, very long time. And Hungary's only had a little snatches of imperial glory on you know under the Austro-Hungarian period, which has never returned. And then before that you'd have to look in the sixteenth century. So there's a security here, all kinds of security here. The fact that it's an island it or it's's i uh it is separated from its imminent enemies. Um I don't think the if to call it patriotic suggests a particular approach to that. But there's always going to be a s a self-conscious sense of being Hungarian, which is not entirely always right wing. No, no. I mean it goes back before the war. Um the idea of deep Hungarianness, which is a literary concept, that there is such a thing as being a Hungarian which is not all the other things that are already mixed in with our soci ety. But it's a kind of it's not like Scots nationalism. But it's it's a little bit like that. And what what do you make of that? How how how significant in your reading is the is the question of the nation um in Hungarian politics and and and particularly this campaign. Always and increasingly so really in the last in the last twenty years. I don't think you can win an election without it. There are certain, you know, sort of cultural touchstones you say, you know, 1848, Peturfi poems, and so on, 56, the flag with uh with a hole cut in the middle and so on. I think like 89 posts 89, not so much actually. Um but yeah, there are there are certain like you know, half a dozen kind of national leitmo tives which um you have to hit really if you'd if you campaign in Hungary. Um but interestingly they're not they're not so recent. Yeah. Yeah. So I d I don't know what that says, why why Hungarians don't really associate with the last thirty five years so much. It's interesting that the first we heard of Orban and I was there in the square where he made this speech in eighteen nine was he Russians out. And what does he finish up with? He finishes up in the lap of Vladimir Putin. I don't think people forget these things. I don't really think there's an enormous love for Putin uh in Hungary, because there is historical memory. 1848 it was the Tsar's troops who put down the the revolution that year, and then there's fifty-six and nineteen forty-nine when they first established themselves. People I think all over are looking right now for uh anything to grasp onto to find a way to support a successful campaign against authoritarians of various kinds. And it produces the desire to find one weird trick to make your campaign successful? I suspect the answer is going to be no, but is there one weird trick from the Majjar campaign that people elsewhere should be trying to replicate. I can't think of Dan . I I would say maybe one takeaway is it's it's much it's much harder to topple an autocrat than never to vote for one. I think that can be a takeaway. Um you know, it's difficult. It's difficult. It took sixteen years and then suddenly it happened, but it did seem like almost an impossible job. Um so yeah, I would say prevention is the best cure. Waiting 16 years for the economy to fail or or to take uh or to take uh you know party inside uh I don't think these are necessary I mean they can work elsewhere. Um you know I mean even the idea of I mean an amazing thing that Maudyard did was, you know, he visited pretty much every settlement in Hungary. Now you can do that in Hungary. It's not really exportable if you're uh in American politics, is it? But uh but he was doing so without much visible security. as a foreign observer to take notice of an election and then not see or hear or think about um a state until uh some other big event happens. Um I think I hope that won't be the case with Hungary. Um, you know, it it seems to me to be both a significant and um interesting place to observe and think about. Um what are the risks? Uh what are the most immediate risks that this new government faces? Well I suppose it may be economic. Um it it its enemies may very well have the power to deprive it of the means to effect the changes it wants to make. So it could become unpopular fairly quickly. Um that's why I think momentum is so important. You're there now, you gotta move, you can 't stand still. You've got this room, move to the next room. And Dan, what uh what faces what faces the incoming government I would say one thing they should avoid is is making the whole of his term about anti corruption battle. Um they need to get, you know, they they you know, they have a few months to get this uh eighteen billion and they um they should they should certainly do that. But in f in four years , you know, there's a there's a there's a whole new um cabinet and so on, there's some interesting characters in it. And those ministers are gonna have to show, you know, what was the vic you know, what were the wins that we had in these four years? It's not, you know, we can see in UK politics, you know, you can have a you can have a government that's in in power for a decade and a half, and within a few months, it's moved on and people ar arenen''tt so so forgiving. It's like the basically you're the government and you sort it out. So they are yeah, don't get mired down in this corruption for four years. That I think is a good place for us to leave it. Uh Geor Tesh, uh Dan Nolan, thank you very much. And if you've enjoyed this conversation and conversations like it, uh you will be interested in reading the London Review of Books. You can of course find the paper on a newsstand near you or online at lrb.co.uk in the latest issue. Andrew O'Hagan reads Patrick Radden Keefe, Will Davies writes on hyperpolitics and Lala Khalili on the fight for control of the Arctic. And you can see a short film about the life and work of George Sirtesh by following a link in the description to this episode or navigating to the LRB website. Thanks for listening.