Lessons from South Korea and Academic Origins

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Welcome to the three hundred and ninety-first episode of the Prof. Didn't see that coming, did you? Didn't see that coming. What's happening? In today's episode, we speak with Erica Chenowith, a political scientist and professor at Harvard's Kennedy School, whose research focuses on political violence, civil resistance, and social movements. Professor Chenowith is widely known for their work on the effectiveness of nonviolent protests, something we've spoken a lot about. We've even quoted their work many times in our newsletter, No Mercy , no mouth, specifically on the topic of resist and unsubscribe. Uh anyways, with that, here's our conversation with Erica Chenoweth. Professor, where does this podcast find you? I'm in Cambridge today. All right, let's bust right into it. You spent your career studying how nonviolent movements succeed or fail, and we've cited your work in our newsletter several times. We even launched our own economic resistance campaign earlier this year. But I want to make sure uh well I'd love your just your insight. How would you describe what your reach research actually says in your own words. I think the most relevant research here is about what is it that makes movements more likely to succeed or fail. And I think the sort of synthesis I would offer from a huge range of research studies on this, my own and others, is that there are really four things that make movements more likely to succeed than others. The first is very large and diverse participation that builds momentum . The second is the ability to leverage that participation into creating defections within the opponent's pillars of support, whether those are the sort of political institutions, the social and cultural institutions , security forces, the business and economic elite that uphold you know a sort of authoritarian status quo, if it will, if you will. The third is the ability to shift between methods of protest to methods of non-cooper ation, like your campaign, and methods of alternative institutions or building mutual aid networks and things along those lines. And then the fourth is the ability to maintain resilience and discipline, even as repression against the movement escalates. And the movements that do those things well tend to succeed more often than the movements that struggle with one or more of those four factors. Trevor Burrus Where do you think most movements get it wrong? Because my sense is becoming just a sophomore student in this recently and listening to you and Timothy Snyder and some other people is that the vast majority fail. W which of the four hurdles do you think trips people have most often? I think getting defections is the hardest. In a study that I did with Zoe Marks and Andrew Hawking, we did a sort of computational study that ran three different types of strategies. The first is the mass mobilization strategy, just get as many people in the streets as possible as quickly as possible and hope for the best with regard to pillars defecting. The second strategy was what we called a naive pillar strategy, which is you know, protest in a way that's trying to get those defections, but you don't know in advance which pillars are most likely to defect. You just go to the nearest one and protest and hope for the best. And then the third strategy is what we call an informed pillar strategy. And that's where the activists have some advanced information about which of the pillars are already kind of on the fence, and they focus on those first. And that then creates early defections in the movement that can create a cascade of defections. And that third strategy is by far the most likely to succeed and the least amount of time. And the first strategy, the mass mobilization strategy, is to get as many people into the streets as possible as quickly as possible and hope that the pillars defect is the least likely to succeed. And so I think part of part of it is just it's actually very challenging both to build a strategy that creates defections and to understand, you know, how to do that in a way that creates the cascade of defections, not just uh an occasional defection here or there because they happen to, you know, push push the right button one day. Aaron Powell So using those four criteria, evaluate the No Kings protests. Yeah. So I I mean my sense is that the No Kings protests and and by this let's just talk about the day the national days of protest, right? Um, which is not all that it is, but um but the protests themselves. I mean, we are seeing growth in numbers over time. We're seeing a diverse range of people from all walks of life coming out and participating in those protests. You know, you could argue it's building momentum in the sense that there are lots of protests that happen between those very large-scale days of action. For example, my team at the Crowd Counting Consortium documented that June 2026 actually had the third most protest event s in a month in the entire first and second Trump administrations. Um and that was largely in reaction to ICE in Minneapolis. Um, but and and and the the killings that happened there. But that just speaks to the fact that the pace of protests and the pace of protest mobilization is quite high and increasing over time, even between these big days of protest. And then when it comes to defections , you know, I think that there are some there are kind of cases where we see that happening, then there are cases where we don't and where you'd otherwise expect them to happen. And I think that's a pretty natural thing to expect at this stage of a movement. Um, which is to say, you know, the the mobilization um against you know autocratic consolidation in the US um has been going on now for the entirety of the second Trump administration, but has um you know, the average movement takes about two and a half years or three years to sort of run its course uh in creating the defections cascades that are sort of necessary to bring about a pro-democratic outcome. And so I think it's sort of on pace, but still with the way to go. And then when it comes to uh diversity or sort of a a broader range of methods of protest. So it's clear that the the large scale days of action are important in both bringing in new participants to the movement and in encouraging existing and and new participants about the power of their collective action. The key here is channeling it into political power through encouraging people then to meet in their communities, to build more community-based organizations, to channel it into electoral power, uh to potentially channel it into methods of non-cooper ation and other strategies of dissent. And then the last thing I'll note is I I think it probably is one of the most disciplined movements we've seen in recent years in terms of the ability to not um overreact to provocations and to maintain basically nonviolent discipline um even as repression has been escalating in a way that signals that the movement is both prepared for that repression and that when that repression happens, the movement can respond to it in a way that shifts the balance of power rather than sort of succumbing to potential disarray Aaron Powell Yeah, that really struck me. Nine million people. And I I have yet to see any reports of any type of violence or civil disobedience. Any thoughts on one of the criteria was that the participants in the protests are from a diverse group. My understanding is these protests, no kings, and and by the way, I find them inspiring and I I don't mean to I don't mean in any way to be critical of them, but people have brought up the notion they seem to be uh the participants seem to be older and whiter. Um any thoughts on uh their ability or the importance of reaching across different demographic groups to make these more effective? It really depends on where it's happening, for one thing. So I think um I think that the the people who have actually done surveys and done demographic counts in those surveys have noted from some of the big cities that they've seen this demo kind of that demographic description that you just gave. But you know, there were over three probably over three thousand events that happen on Saturday, um, many of them in places that have never seen a protest in the last generation. Many of them a lot of rural towns, right? That are mostly Republican. Yeah. Exactly. And and I think really there's also kind of a convergence, I would say, in some places, where um where ICE operations have been very intense that has drawn in um a lot of younger people and people from different walks of life into the movement. And so I I actually think this last No Kings saw the convergence of of, you know, it was probably more demographically diverse than the prior, in part because of how many streams of opposition and resistance are kind of verging in those big days of action. Clearly, like the more people from the more walks of life who take part, the more powerful the movement will be. And it's often the case that movements, you know, different different formations appeal to different demographics. And the more those formations come together, the more powerful they will be in shoring up the the capacities of those different segments of society I wonder I'll I'll just put forward a thesis and I'm literally I'm flying on instruments here, but I wonder if some of it is that younger Americans, the most recent protests, Black Lives Matter, and the women's marches, which were inspiring, but I'm not sure those groups felt like they registered a lot of change. Whereas older Americans uh still remember the protests, the Vietnam protests, civil rights protests, or at least learned about them in school, which had a huge impact. I wonder if it's just one group says this is worth my Saturday, and another group is maybe a little bit more cynical. You could be onto something in some cases. I would just note that there's some interesting research out there that shows that, for example, the women's march of 201 7 was uh the particip ation in women's marches just in that single day had a really powerful predictive effect on the diversity of candidates that ran in the midterm elections in 2018 and uh the the blue wave that came in in 2018 flipping uh Congress to uh be a Democratic Congress. They they can show a strong correlation between the numbers of people who participated on that day and the outcome of that election. And the same is true for the 2020 election actually. That uh large participation in Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020 were also correlated with outcomes in the presidential election results and in shifts in public opinion and in changes that were substantive around, for example, progressive attorneys general or DAs being, you know, elevated in in local and state elections. So, you know, I I think that there are there are reasons to be skeptical, but also those types of stories aren't necessarily very prominent out there in the world . And um and I think it it can be, you know, really important to elevate the ways that even a single day of protest can have those types of uh electoral impacts. Same for the the Tea Party. The Tea Party protests, there was a paper by economists that showed that it was powerfully correlated with the 2010 midterm election result, right? So people shouldn't underestimate how important it is, and they shouldn't overestimate how important it is um uh compared to the other things that also lead mass movements to succeed. Yeah. So one a thesis and an observation. If the connection between inspiring candidates and people to turn out to the voting booth. And at a minimum this creates infrastructure and makes you more invested in outcomes, right? Uh it sounds as if if this holds, and I don't see any reason why it wouldn't, it's going to be a very ugly November for Republicans. Yeah. I mean if if the pattern obtains in this case, then we would expect uh we would expect a uh a loss in the midterms. Now I also think that none of these models have predictive power, right? Um, so so uh lots of things can be different. But but I think the yes, if the if if what we saw in 2017 and twenty eighteen tra cks in this case than um than we would expect in a normal kind of election year um and under normal circumstances to see a similar outcome in in the uh 2026 midterm. We'll be right back after a quick break. Support for the show comes from LinkedIn. It's a shame when the best B2B marketing gets wasted on the wrong audience. Like, imagine running an ad for cataract surgery on Saturday morning cartoons, or running a promo for this show on a video about Roblox or something. 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Dell PCs with Intel inside are built for the moments you plan and the ones you don't. They're for those all-night study sessions, the moments you're working from a cafe, and realize every outlet is taken. The times you're deep in your That's why we build tech that adapts to you, built with a long-lasting batteries so you're not scrambling for an outlet, and built in intelligence that makes updates around your schedule, not in the middle of it. Find technology built for the way you work at Dell.co. uk forward slash DellPCs. Built for you . The other question I have for you is I keep hearing this three and a half percent number. And that is if you get to this three and a half percent hurdle, uh and I think with 350 million people would have said that would be th uh twelve point two five million, I think, if I'm doing my math correctly. Somewhere in there, right? Twelve plus million. That that's when you see real change. That that's when the government can't ignore it . Where did that number come from? And it strikes me that my understanding is the No Kings protest went from 7 million to 9 million million. So it's building momentum. It's in no way fizzling out. And why is it we need to get to twelve and a quarter million? Do you buy that three and a half percent number? Where did it come from? Yeah. So uh the three and a half percent statistic is based on a historical observation of three hundred and twenty-three mass mov ements between 1900 and 2006 . And it came from uh a conversation I was having with uh with an activist actually who asked me if there was some kind of critical threshold above which no movements had failed in terms of mass participation. And so this was after a study that Maria Stefan and I did, our book had come out, and I was doing some workshops and talks about it. And so like, just looked in the data and and then found that observation that among the campaigns that had it had uh that we had documented and for for which we had kind of peak participation estimates, none of the campaigns that had moved above that three and a half percent national population threshold um had failed. So I think the the the things to know about that are first of all it's a historical observation, not a prediction . Second of all, as you know, historical observations are always just that. They're not also prescriptive, which is the sense that if we like try to aim for three and a half percent, knowing that that's the target. Um, are we doing something different than what people did historically when they didn't know about that kind of a threshold and wouldn't have been trying to game it as it were? Um and then the third piece is that there have been since that period exceptions to the rule, which is to say like Bahrain, for example, had its own uh attempted Arab awakening in 2011 that fizzled out fully by 2014 . And in that case, it looks like during their peak moment, they had about six percent of the population mobilized in their sort of central area. And that ended up failing. And one of the reasons that it was defeated is important and instructive. It was defeated because there were no defections. And there were no defections because in that case the monarchy decided not to send its own troops out to repress and got help from Saudi Arabia to do it. And that is a really important technique of preventing defections that uh that we've then seen happen elsewh ere. And the the logic is that if there are fewer kind of social uh connections between the security forces and the people protesting, that there will be less hesitation and brutality toward the protesters. That's just something that has been an adaptation on the side of pretty persistent authoritarian regimes at this point and kind of taking the wind out of the sails of these movements, even when they get very large. And it's something that uh that we should know. It's just that there have been adaptations on the the government side um and that uh movements shouldn't take for granted that if they hit a a a historical threshold that That the same effects will naturally obtain without other types of strategy and organization building and leadership. So granted, it's probably harder to get more granular data, but the protests in Iran , a a different complexion, much I would argue I don't know, more complex, more severe, whatever the term is. What are your observations? What do you think the media is getting wrong about the protests today in Iran? I guess I have two observations about it. I mean first of all the repression that took place against the civilian population there massacres that took place are some of the worst we've seen since for sure the Syrian revolution in 2011 and 2012. You know, one of the things that I remember happening at that point is that after the US extracted Maduro uh and brought him to the United States, uh, there was strong in power ful signaling by the United States that Iran would be next. And that coincided with a period of improvised protests in response to basically, economic concerns like you know, a currency crisis and other things that people were reacting to on the ground. And then when it sounded like there was going to be some kind of external intervention, from what I understand, there was there was a sense of now or never among many of the protesters who were aware of that. And it allowed for or even enabled more risky action uh than they otherwise would have taken. And then the fact that the U.S. didn't actually uh intervene at that time or do a similar operation as it were, you know, just kind of speaks to the very tricky global dynamics of these things and the uh as they say moral hazard problem of signaling different types of international support when none is necessarily forthcoming. Um and that the people on the ground pay the price. I think and that there are some similar dynamics with that and the Syrian revolution, in fact. I remember in those days there were people who were exiles from Syria or , you know, had recently departed from there trying to lobby, you know, foreign governments to intervene the way that they had intervened in Libya. And there was a sense that was almost inevitably that it was going to happen in Syria. And more risky action was taken as a result of that in a way. So I think that's really very tricky. What happens on the ground in Iran is is so hard because there is not really a formal opposition or opposition groups that have the capacity to even connect with one another, uh, much less organize a strategic mass movement. Or spokespeople, isn't that key to a resistance that you have spokespeople that people can rally around? Spokespeople for sure, but also just strategy, right? Like thinking about um beyond the just going to the streets and trying to amass uh large shows of force, but also like how how to tap into the different sources of weakness in the government and begin to, you know, chip away at loyaltyalties. Like those types of things are really important and necessary, particularly against a um an authoritarian regime as durable and as formidable as the Iranian regime. And so uh what organizational capacity does exist is outside the country, right? So you have people who are sort of more recent departures from Iran, from say the reform era, who have more ties to people on the ground , um, but fewer kind of resources to help mobilize. And then you have people from the previous era, like the previous Iranian revolution, um, many of whom are kind of organizing around uh the crown prince and and and the like and and so the even the external opposition is quite divided um and those who are rallying around um reza pallavi like don't have nearly as much legitimacy on the ground as the more recent departures, but they don't have the capacity that he that he has and the resources. So it's just a very um very tricky situation that I think helps to illuminate a lot of the the fact that when people rise up anymore, it's not just against their own government. Like they're in this sort of global environment that's changing very quickly and it's creating very challenging terrain. And Admiral James Stavridas on , uh, who was the NATO supreme allied commander, and he said something uh obvious but insightful, and that is the shock troops, kind of the Marines of the protest, the ones who are most aggressive and quite frankly willing to give up their lives and they did, uh there was 30,000 of them and they're dead now. And that they kind of the our timing was just wrong, right? That you wanted you wanted support from America or perhaps military action before those 30,000 people took to the streets. And and there there's going to be a limited supply of people who are willing to give their lives for a movement like this. I have been shocked at the lack of resistance and the lack of protest amongst corporate leaders. I'm I'm convinced that of the five hundred fortune, five hundred leaders, 490 of them wake up in the morning, look in the mirror, and say, hello, madam or mister President. I think they're all waiting to be drafted to run for president. And I have been the silence is deafening. And whatever your politics are , I think there's a very solid argument that what is going on right now is not good for business at a very capitalist level. And there has been crickets. Have you done any research on the importance of I I go back to Weimar Germany when a lot of the industrial s uh captains of industry in Germany stayed quiet or kind of did a deal with Hitler, if you will. But any parallels or any historical references around uh the lack of protest or resistance from the corporate world uh in your studies? So this is a really important issue. Uh it's not my primary area , but what I'll say is if you think about cases like South Africa, for example, this is a case where clearly the linchpin in the sustainability of apartheid ended up being the corporate and business elite . And uh that was a case where the security forces were never gonna defect to you know, the the sort of unitedocrat Demic Front and the and the black opposition. But the sort of implication of that was that if the security force pillar is not available, then what about the business and economic elites they're upholding, you know, the the apartheid state. And so that is the way that apartheid uh ultimately fell was by a variety of economic actions, whether those were boycotts of white-owned businesses, whether they were um ultimately multinational corporations pulling out of the country, whether it was strikes and work stoppages combined with massive protests and marches, like that, that is ultimately what pressured the business class to pressure the national party, which was the propartheid party, to elect a reformer and dec lerk when they had the opportunity to do so. And when he came to power in the national party, he immediately like pushed through legislation to unban the ANC and start negotiations. Um, and they found a path to a democratic transition without a civil war in a country that looked like it was on the path to either, you know, continued , you know, military garrison state with a white supremacist government or it was on the path to civil war. And so they they found that that way and it was because of the pressure put on the business community to change what they viewed as their own interests and in the stakes . And so like I I think they are the the business and and economic community is so important . Um and as you mentioned there are other cases of you know autocratic breakthrough moments where you know if big business has had acted a different way it probably would have created huge amounts of friction and instead they didn't and so it didn't we'll be right back Hi, I'm Brene Brown. And I'm Adam Grant. And we're here to invite you to the Curiosity Shop. A podcast that's a place for listening, wondering, thinking, feeling, and questioning. It's gonna be fun. We rarely agree. But we almost never disagree, and we're always learning. That's true. You can subscribe to the Curiosity Shop on YouTube or follow in your favorite podcast app to automatically receive new episodes every Thursday. We're back with more from Professor Erica Chenoweth. So do you think we we constantly use a term there's a difference between being right and being effective? And the No King's protests are are both . But I'll put forward a thesis or uh a question, and obviously it's a loaded question because I have a bias here. What would be more effective, the protests of nine million people or potentially nine million people stopping on Aaron Powell I'm gonna give a totally un unsatisfying response because it depends on the context, which is to say that you mean nuanced? I think it depends on the durability of it, right? So and and actually how much cost is imposed. I also think that imposing costs is not the only way to to change behavior, right? So there are there are other ways to change beh Negotiating, uh induc ements, um, trying to get you know, like there the the sometimes an oppositional approach or an adversarial approach like that um is necessary to demonstrate what can happen or what the consequences are of inaction or complicity. And sometimes uh there's low hanging fruit and and just finding a way to identify shared interest and then go with that is is another way. There's a study out by one of my colleagues, Jonathan Pinckney , who together I think with another author or two was talking about methods of inducing defections. And particularly, I think for the business community, they were saying that sometimes more private, behind the scenes, quiet organizing and persuasion work is going to go a longer way than kind of public advers arial approaches. Now, there's always gonna be a range of interests and where different businesses and corporations place themselves on that spectrum. And the ones that are the most tightly aligned with the with an authoritarian or aspiring or authoritarian regime are going to be the hardest to get at. But others who are a little bit further or just trying to stay out of the fray or whatever, those are the ones to sort of uh think about focusing on first. And then, you know, the more adversarial approaches then can be applied to those who are kind of further along in the sort of authoritarian direction . So I I think that's an intriguing uh uh proposition. Um and I it hasn't been fully t you know tested uh in the US case, I think, but uh is an interesting way to think about it. I think it's an interesting insight. And again, it's kind of hiding in plain sight. But the thing about the No Kings protests is they are very positive. They have a really nice feel to them. You know, you bring your kids, you the signs are funny, you feel a sense of citizenship, camaraderie. They are very uh very positive. And I think it's I think it's hard to be critical of them. They d they just look like good people doing good things. Imagine there's a large swath of the population that is really upset by the administration's activities. And they believe that action absorbs anxiety and they want to do something. And they all got together and elected a uh a board of directors and said, All right, who do we reach out to to organize the next big form of resistance or protest? And I said, Okay, we're gonna reach out to Professor Chenno ist. And you were given the ability to organize a protest or a form of resistance, to shape it and say this is this is I want to be focused on effectiveness, whether it's getting a mass secret police out of cities or changing our policies on immigrants, whatever it might be. But if you were given, if you were, if you will , uh the CEO of this thing and you got to shape it, what elements would would be incorporated? What would it look like? Do you mean on the infrastructure side or on the like tactical and strategic side? Yes. Okay If it's on the infrastructure side, like it it 's an interesting question about like what capacities are needed right now and and at what scale. Um, and I I think that you know my argument would be that in in other cases where we've seen successful kind of democratic U-turns take place, usually there's been some kind of umbrella formation, like the United Democratic Front and South Africa or like its comparison in Chile under Pinochet. Or more recently in South Korea, there was sort of a united alliance. And I would argue that we need some kind of umbrella formation that's giving shape to what already exists in the US, which is a huge number of ingredients for what makes for a successful democracy movement. And I think that in terms of the capacities needed, you know, there's clearly the sort of mobilization capacity that uh that that exists already, um, but then also uh kind of uh an ability to communicate um broadly about um what's happening in a way that that brings common knowledge uh to the population at large about you know what what's going on and what they should know about it and what they might do about it. Like I said earlier, I think like what what we're seeing right now in the US is is consistent with what we've seen in a lot of different successful democracy movements, in part because there has been such robust training infrastructure set up for things like, you know, observing ICE operations. And because of that, the killings of Renee Good and Alex Predi backfired. It's only because cameras were rolling and people were there observing because they knew how to do that and they knew how to get the information out that those stories ended up being the sort of official narrative about those stories ended up being contested in the first place, right? Um and then uh there's training in nonviolent discipline, there's training in non-cooperation, like all of those things are happening. There's so many people around the country uh in organizations trying to support that work. And I think that's, you know, part of why we've seen it play out the way it has. So I I think in in terms of uh it it's hard to to to focus on more than the the sort of four things that I mentioned that successful movements do, right? And um and so I and I and I think those those things are happening. So I I I I guess this is all to say I I wouldn't really suggest that that m much is different in the country except um except what I mentioned about a a sort of broader umbrella formation helping to make it more than the sum of its parts. That I think is an outstanding example that we don't talk enough about. Can you talk about what went down in South Korea? So the really abbreviated version of this is that last December there was an attempted coup by the incumbent president. And while it was underway, meaning w after he declared martial law and was enacting the coup, uh, there was a huge umbrella formation , largely represented by a trade federation and unions, that came out and said, uh, by declaring martial law, you've declared the end of your pre presidency, and we're going to bring the country to an orderly standstill tomorrow morning if this thing goes down. And they were able to bring thousands of people to uh within minutes of the declaration of martial law also to a nonviolent protest out side of the um like a main government building. And by the morning had made such a credible commitment to being able to shut down the country that the people who were doing the coup blinked basically like the the senior military kind of hesitated and said they they didn't think they would go along with it. Um and the president had to basically cancel the martial law order and effectively try to cancel the coup. And then, you know, by the next day, the trade unions and the sort of pro-democracy movement had come out and said, we're really glad the coup has ended, but that's not enough. Like you tried to have a coup, and so you're going to be impeached. And they launched impeachment proceedings after one failed attempt because the ruling party tried to get around a quor um rule so that they didn't have to show up and and actually participate in the impeachment proceedings. The movement basically demanded that they show up and and vote and they did and the president was impeached. Um and then he's he tried to appeal it. He lost the appeal in the Supreme Court. Like he's out and um and gonna be held accountable for it. So that that's the way that's the way both a a successful movement works and how to stop a coup and prevent it from happening again. I think the the one of the things that's so powerful about the example is that they could credibly commit that they could bring the country to an orderly standstill. And that's why it worked. Um, and so I think the the deterrent impact that they were able to have was profound. Um and it's just a lesson to learn, I think. This is such fascinating material. How do I just for a lot of young people listening to the podcast? How did you stumble on, or was this more deliberate, how did you stumble upon this domain? It was actually when I was finishing my PhD in political science that I was invited to apply to go to a workshop on how to teach about nonviolent resistance. And this was a topic I had never learned about, had not encountered in my research. I studied terrorism and political violence exclusively at that time. Um, and so I wanted to go to the workshop uh to put it on my CV and you know broad my network and um get free books and learn how to teach this topic and um and I just thought the the material was very interesting but I noticed that there hadn't really been like a quantitative treatment of the question about whether nonviolent resistance was actually a realistic alternative to violence in different difficult settings, you know, like in settings where we would typically expect people to use ar med conflict to promote their agenda . Um and so my colleague Maria Stefan and I, whom I met there, decided to team up and do such a study. And so that's what led to our 2011 book on uh which is called Why Civil Resistance Works. And in that book, we you know start with the descriptive observation that two, you know, the nonviolent mass campaigns that we studied um from 1900 to 2006 had a higher success rate than the violent campaigns that we studied. And we set about trying to understand why that was the case. And so the book sort of has two parts. The front is trying to understand the strategic advan tages of nonviolent resistance. And the second half of the book is trying to explain why some movements succeed while others fail. And there's been then a a very large literature that's emerged on this topic, which has, you know, both been critical and uh reinforcing of the findings depending on what they are. And as I mentioned, I think there's this sort of consensus now, 16 or so years later, about the things that make movements more likely to succeed. And so th that's the four things I mentioned. Eric Achenowith is a political scientist and professor at Harvard Kennedy School whose research focuses on political violence, civil resistance. Professor Chenowith joins us from Cambridge. Professor, I just uh such a nice moment for you, unfortunately under not great circumstances, but it's just it's re